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I. INTRODUCTION
In Burton v. Stewart,1 the Supreme Court narrowly avoided
deciding whether Blakely v. Washington2 is a “new” rule, as well as the
related question of whether Blakely should be applied retroactively
on collateral review. Instead, the Court ruled that Mr. Burton’s
petition for review did not meet the “gatekeeping requirements of 28
U.S.C. § 2244(b).”3 By deciding Burton on procedural grounds rather
than considering the merits of the underlying claims upon which
certiorari was granted, the Court delayed consideration of important
issues, which are likely to resurface.
In this commentary, I begin by describing Mr. Burton’s claim that
the Court’s Blakely decision should be available to prisoners
challenging their prison sentences through habeas corpus review.4
Next, I review the historical underpinnings of the Court’s Teague v.
5
Lane decision, which established the modern framework for
determining when the Court’s decisions will be retroactively
6
applicable. I then explore how the Court has applied one part of the
Teague test, the critical determination of when a decision is “new.”7
Finally, I attempt to apply this part of the Teague test to the Blakely v.
8
Washington decision. As this attempt reveals the uncertainty
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surrounding the application of the Teague test, I conclude with a brief
discussion of the implications of the continued use of this method for
determining when a Supreme Court decision is “new,” and propose
9
that the Court should rethink, or at least carefully apply this test.
II. THE PLEA FOR RETROACTIVITY IN BURTON V.
STEWART
In the June 2000 decision of Apprendi v. New Jersey, the Supreme
Court described the constitutionally guaranteed right that “[o]ther
than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty
for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be
submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”10 The
11
Apprendi decision impacted Lonnie Burton, a prisoner in the State
of Washington, whose sentence had depended on his sentencing
judge’s independent findings.12 After he had exhausted his direct
13
appeals, and his conviction had become final, Mr. Burton filed a
Personal Restraint Petition in the Supreme Court of Washington as
well as a writ of habeas corpus in federal court on the grounds that his
conviction was unconstitutional.14 In both “collateral attacks,” he
relied on Apprendi, arguing that the sentencing judge had
impermissibly relied on facts neither proven to a jury, nor proven
beyond a reasonable doubt.15 However, both the state and federal
courts denied Mr. Burton’s request for relief, the Supreme Court of
Washington explicitly stating that “Apprendi does not apply to
exceptional sentences that are otherwise within the statutory
maximum for the crime.”16

9. See infra Conclusion.
10. 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000).
11. Mr. Burton was convicted of rape, robbery, and burglary in a Washington state court.
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Burton v. Waddington, No. 05-9222, 2006 WL 1525997, at *3
(Feb. 10, 2006). His sentence for these crimes was consecutively imposed after the court found
exceptional circumstances under Washington’s Revised Code § 9.94A.400 (2007). Id.
12. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Burton v. Waddington, No. 05-9222, 2006 WL 1525997,
at *3 (Feb. 10, 2006); see also Transcript of Oral Argument at 37, Burton v. Stewart, 127 S. Ct.
793 (2007), (Justice Stevens noting that “[i]t nowhere says they’re unnecessary either” to the
judge’s sentence).
13. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Burton v. Waddington, No. 05-9222, 2006 WL 1525997,
at *3 (Feb. 10, 2006).
14. Id. at *4.
15. Id.
16. Id. at *5 (quoting Supreme Court of Washington, Ruling Denying Review, No. 72656-4
(July 16, 2002)).
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Following the completion of Mr. Burton’s case, the Supreme
Court decided Blakely v. Washington. In Blakely, the Court agreed
with Mr. Burton’s argument, and disagreed with the lower courts’
characterization of Apprendi, holding that “the relevant ‘statutory
maximum’ is not the maximum sentence a judge may impose after
finding additional facts, but the maximum he may impose without any
additional findings.”17 This ruling meant that judges in future cases
could no longer independently find facts as the judge did in Lonnie
18
Burton’s case. However, the Ninth Circuit ruled that the Supreme
Court’s clarification of the law would not benefit Mr. Burton, as his
conviction had become final prior to the Supreme Court’s Blakely
decision.19 In Burton v. Waddington, the Supreme Court granted
certiorari to address whether the Blakely decision applied to criminal
defendants whose conviction had already become “final” before it
was decided.20 Though the Court remanded Burton based on the
district court’s lack of jurisdiction to consider the habeas petition, the
issues contained in the case are likely to be raised again and remain
important for practitioners.
The Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari in Burton represented the
latest in a long line of cases in which the Court has considered
whether one of its decisions should be available to prisoners
collaterally attacking their convictions through a writ of habeas
corpus. Traditional jurisprudence in this area relies heavily on an
analysis by Justice Harlan for the purpose of the “great writ,” and his
proposal that a “new rule” should generally not be available to such
21
prisoners.
III. THE RETROACTIVITY RULE:
THE ROAD TO TEAGUE V. LANE
The modern framework for assessing whether Supreme Court
decisions should be retroactively applied was developed in a series of
cases following the Court’s 1965 proclamation that the Constitution

17. 542 U.S. 296, 303–04 (2004).
18. See, e.g., State v. Washington, 143 P.3d 606 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006) (holding a Blakely
violation under facts substantially similar to those in Mr. Burton’s case).
19. Burton v. Waddington, 142 F. App’x. 297 (9th Cir. 2005).
20. Burton v, Stewart, 127 S. Ct. 793 (2007).
21. See infra Part II.
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22
does not require retroactive application of criminal decisions. This
framework was born in Justice Harlan’s dissent in Desist v. United
23
States, subsequently germinated in his concurring opinion in Mackey
v. United States,24 and culminated in the Court’s decision in Teague v.
25
Lane after Justice Harlan was no longer on the Court. To replace the
26
balancing test in place at that time, Justice Harlan created a
framework in which he relied heavily on the difference between
direct review of, and collateral attack on, a conviction.
For cases on direct review, Justice Harlan noted that “[m]atters of
basic principle are at stake” when deciding to which defendants to
27
apply the Court’s decisions. Lamenting a system in which the Court
would “simply pick and choose from among similarly situated
defendants those who alone will receive the benefit,”28 he concluded
that the Court has “no right on direct review to treat one case
differently from another with respect to constitutional provisions
applicable to both.”29 He rested this conclusion on his view of the role
of the Court: “I continue to believe that a proper perception of our
duties as a court of law, charged with applying the Constitution to
resolve every legal dispute within our jurisdiction on direct review,
mandates that we apply the law as it is at the time, not as it once
was.”30 Thus, to achieve fairness, Justice Harlan believed that a
Supreme Court decision that interprets the criminal law should be
applied to every criminal defendant whose case is still pending, until
all appeals have been exhausted.
Justice Harlan viewed the application of Supreme Court decisions
to prisoners who already had exhausted their direct appeals very
differently. The common-sense notion that everyone should benefit
from a changed interpretation of the law, which Justice Harlan
applied for direct review, was here counterbalanced by an
understanding that “the law” is not an absolute truth that judges
“find,” but is more simply just a question of what was “on the books”

22.
23.
24.
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26.
27.
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Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
394 U.S. 244, 256 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
401 U.S. 667, 675 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
489 U.S. 288 (1989).
E.g., Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 636.
Desist, 394 U.S. at 258.
Id. at 259.
Mackey, 401 U.S. at 701 (Harlan, J., concurring).
Id. at 681.
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31
when a crime was committed. Because the courts’ role is “to say
32
what the law is,” equal application of the law to everyone would only
require an equal application of the law as it was then understood.
Thus, Justice Harlan’s description of the role of the Court suggests
that there is nothing inherently aberrant in applying different rules to
people who were convicted when different Supreme Court decisions
were in effect. For him, the issue of whether a decision should be
applied to cases on collateral review hinges on what makes the
collateral review system different from the system of direct appeal.
Noting the “expansion of the writ” in the prior years, Justice
Harlan asserted that “[t]he primary justification given by the Court
for extending the scope of habeas to all alleged constitutional errors is
that it provides a quasi-appellate review function, forcing trial and
appellate courts in both the federal and state system to toe the
33
constitutional mark.” In other words, the purpose of collateral
review is to serve as a procedural safeguard designed to ensure that
courts at all levels are applying the law, including relevant Supreme
Court decisions, as it was then fairly understood. As Justice Harlan
described, “the threat of habeas serves as a necessary additional
incentive for trial and appellate courts throughout the land to conduct
their proceedings in a manner consistent with established
constitutional standards.”34 Most important, he noted, “[i]n order to
perform this deterrence function, . . . the habeas court need only apply
the constitutional standards that prevailed at the time the original
proceedings took place.”35 This purpose is reflected in the statutory
requirement that habeas review be granted only if the lower court
uses an “unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law,
as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.”36
Importantly, Justice Harlan did not envision habeas review as
primarily a process for obtaining justice for an individual defendant.

31. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 79 (1938) (“But law in the sense in which
courts speak of it today does not exist without some definite authority behind it. . . . The
authority and only authority is the State, and if that be so, the voice adopted by the State as its
own (whether it be of its Legislature or of its Supreme Court) should utter the last word.”)
(quoting Black and White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown and Yellow Taxicab & Transfer
Co., 276 U.S. 518, 533–35 (1928))).
32. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
33. Mackey, 401 U.S. at 687.
34. Desist, 394 U.S. at 258–59.
35. Teague v. Lyons, 489 U.S. 288, 306 (1989) (quoting Desist, 394 U.S. at 263).
36. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (1996).
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As the Court has reminded, this system is not intended to be a
substitute for direct review, and, is not “defined . . . by reference to a
perceived need to assure that an individual accused of crime is
37
afforded a trial free of constitutional error.” As Justice Harlan
observed, “it is not a principal purpose of the writ to inquire whether
38
a criminal convict did in fact commit the deed alleged.”
This understanding of the purpose of habeas explains why Justice
Harlan felt that “new” Supreme Court decisions should generally not
be applied retroactively to habeas petitioners. Asking lower courts to
correctly predict the outcome of Supreme Court decisions does
nothing to advance habeas’ purpose of keeping lower courts
accountable. An understanding of this purpose of habeas also explains
why all decisions that are not deemed to be new should be available
to someone collaterally attacking their confinement through habeas
review. If the Supreme Court sees its decision as dictated by
precedent, a lower court’s failure to come to the same conclusion is,
by definition, “unreasonable application of clearly established Federal
39
law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.”
Deciding to apply “established” rules retroactivity is just as important
to serving the purpose of habeas as the decision not to apply “new”
rules retroactively, by requiring the lower courts to faithfully apply
the Court’s explicit decisions as well as to apply the logic implicit in
the decision to any new situation. Retroactive application of any
decision that clearly and logically follows from a previous one is the
role of a “reasonable jurist,” one who does not look for ways to
distinguish a case from the Court’s decisions, but rather faithfully
follows both the decision and its intent. By 1982, the Court viewed
this principle as obvious:
[W]hen a decision of this Court merely has applied settled
precedents to new and different factual situations, no real question
has arisen as to whether the later decision has arisen as to whether
the later decision should apply retrospectively. In such cases, it has
been a foregone conclusion that the rule of the later case applies in
earlier cases, because the later decision has not in fact altered that
40
rule in any material way.

37.
38.
39.
40.

Kuhlman v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 447 (1986) (plurality opinion).
Mackey, 401 U.S. at 694.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (1996).
United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 549 (1982).
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Justice Harlan’s analysis also relied on the state’s interest in the
finality of its judgments, and what this means to the scope of habeas
review. He regarded this interest as “substantial,” asserting that it is “a
matter of fundamental import that there be a visible end to the
41
litigable aspect of the criminal process,” and found agreement in
Congress’s having changed the habeas statute “to introduce a greater
measure of finality into the law.”42 He was particularly suspicious of
whether habeas was a proper use of “the very limited resources
43
society has allocated to the criminal process,” when collateral review
is utilized “to relitigate facts buried in the remote past.”44
Despite these concerns about retroactivity, Justice Harlan made
clear that fairness to an individual, and the demands of justice,
nevertheless, required application of some “new” decisions even to
collateral review. In particular, he defined those situations to include
when the rule involves “substantive due process,” placing “private
individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making
authority to proscribe,”45 or when the decision requires adherence to
“procedures that . . . are implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.”46
These latter situations have often been described as the “‘watershed
rules of criminal procedure’ implicating the fundamental fairness and
accuracy of the criminal proceeding.”47
48
In 1987, in Griffith v. Kentucky, the Court adopted the first part
of Justice Harlan’s opinion, deciding that a “new” rule would be
applied to all cases pending on direct review. Two years later, in
Teague v. Lane, the Court adopted Justice Harlan’s framework in its
49
entirety. To conduct a Teague analysis, therefore, the Court needs to
first determine whether or not a rule is “new.” If it is not “new,” but
rather directly follows from a prior decision, it is retroactively
applicable. If it is “new,” it will not be retroactively applied, unless it
falls into one of the exceptions described by Justice Harlan. Whether
Blakely is a “new” rule and, if so, whether it should nonetheless be

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Mackey, 401 U.S. at 690.
Id. at 688.
Id. at 691.
Id.
Id. at 692.
Id. at 693 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 495 (1990).
479 U.S. 314 (1987).
489 U.S. 288 (1989).
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retroactively applied was the issue before the Court in Burton v.
50
Stewart.
IV. THE COURT’S APPLICATION OF THE TEST FOR “NEW”
As Justice Harlan noted in Mackey v. United States, there are:
[I]nevitable difficulties that will arise in attempting to determine
whether a particular decision has really announced a ‘new’ rule at
all or whether it has simply applied a well-established
constitutional principle to govern a case which is closely analogous
to those which have been previously considered in the prior case
51
law.

When adopting Harlan’s framework for determining the
retroactivity of the Court’s decisions, the Teague v. Lane Court agreed
with this proposition, acknowledging “[i]t is admittedly often difficult
to determine when a case announces a new rule.”52 Experience with
the Teague rule has not simplified this inquiry.
In Desist v. United States, Justice Harlan first described a decision
53
that his proposed framework would not characterize as “new.” This
case involved a situation in which the Court had “never previously
encountered the precise situation raised,” but wherein the “decision in
that case rested upon . . . established doctrine.”54 He characterized
these non-“new” decisions as follows:
[M]any, though not all, of this Court’s constitutional decisions are
grounded upon fundamental principles whose content does not
change dramatically from year to year, but whose meanings are
altered slowly and subtly as generation succeeds generation. In
such a context it appears very difficult to argue against application
of the “new” rule in all habeas cases since one could never say with
any assurance that this Court would have ruled differently at the
55
time the petitioner’s conviction became final.

50. 127 S. Ct. 793 (2007).
51. Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 695 (1971) (internal quotations and citation
omitted) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
52. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 301 (1989).
53. Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 263 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (describing the
decision in Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969), as resting upon Johnson v. United
States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948), and Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964)).
54. Id.
55. Id. at 263–64.
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56
The Court applied this principle in Yates v. Aiken, holding that
57
the prior decision in Francis v. Franklin had been “merely an
application of the principle that governed . . . in Sandstrom v.
Montana,”58 and thus “did not announce a new rule.”59 In Teague, the
Court added specificity to the analysis of what constitutes a “new”
rule by stating that “[i]n general . . . a case announces a new rule when
it breaks new ground or imposes a new obligation on the States or the
60
Federal Government.” In addition, “a case announces a new rule if
the result was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the
defendant’s conviction became final.”61 With respect to the rule being
considered in Teague itself, the Court relied heavily on its having
62
overruled a previous case in order to conclude that it was a new rule.
In the decades following Teague, the Court has applied this test
for what constitutes a new rule while continuing to reflect upon the
test’s origin in the purpose of the writ of habeas corpus. Yet, through
these decisions, the “new rule” test has undergone a palpable change
in emphasis, with the result that fewer decisions can be characterized
as not being “new.” In Butler v. McKellar, the Court reiterated that
“[a] new decision that explicitly overrules an earlier holding obviously
63
‘breaks new ground’ or ‘imposes a new obligation,’” but cautioned
64
that the “inquiry will be more difficult” in most cases. The Butler
Court viewed the Teague test as one that “validates reasonable, good65
faith interpretations of existing precedents,” a description that
indicates the Court would be reluctant to characterize a decision as
not being “new.”66 Further highlighting this perspective, the Court
asserts that “the fact that a court says its decision is . . . ‘controlled’ by
a prior decision, is not conclusive for purposes of deciding whether
the current decision is a ‘new rule’ under Teague.”67 Thus, the Court
relied on “a significant difference of opinion on the part of several

56. 484 U.S. 211 (1988).
57. 471 U.S. 307 (1985).
58. 484 U.S. 211, 217 (1988).
59. Id. at 218.
60. 489 U.S. 288, 301 (1989).
61. Id.
62. Id. at 295 (“Batson constituted ‘an explicit and substantial break with prior precedent
because it overruled a portion of Swain.’”) (citations omitted).
63. 494 U.S. 407, 412 (1990).
64. Id. at 413.
65. Id. at 414.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 415.
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68
lower courts” and its view that its decision was “susceptible to
69
debate among reasonable minds” to conclude that its decision in
Arizona v. Roberson70 was “new.”71
On the same day the Court decided Butler, it also described, the
“new rule” test as a determination of whether a lower court “would
have felt compelled by existing precedent to conclude that the rule . . .
was required by the Constitution.”72 Four dissenters in these two cases
described the majority as having “limited drastically the scope of
habeas corpus relief through the application of a virtually allencompassing definition of ‘new rule.’”73 Nonetheless, the majority of
the Court maintained that if “reasonable jurists may disagree,” a rule
74
is new.
A year later, in a situation closely analogous to that presented in
75
Burton, the Court considered whether two cases were applications of
76
a previously announced principle or represented new rules.77
Importantly, in finding that the cases did not break new ground and
did not announce new rules, the Court attempted to limit the broader
definition of “new rule,” noting that “reasonableness . . . is an
objective standard”78 and that a circuit court’s contrary view is “not
79
dispositive.”
However, subsequent cases have confirmed the broad reading of
“new.” A few years later, in Lambrix v. Singletary, the Court
considered “significant” to its conclusion that a decision had
announced a “new rule” the fact that that decision “itself did not
80
purport to rely upon any controlling precedent.” This case contains,
perhaps, the broadest language yet regarding the definition of “new
rule,” stating that Teague “asks whether [a case] was dictated by

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
(1990).
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Id.
Id.
486 U.S 675 (1988).
Butler, 494 U.S. at 415.
Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 488 (1990).
Id. at 497 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 234 (1990).
Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356 (1988); Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738
Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980).
Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S. 222 (1992).
Id. at 237.
Id.
520 U.S. 518, 528 (1997).
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precedent—i.e., whether no other interpretation was reasonable.”
When applying the “reasonableness” test for whether a decision is
“new,” the Court has paid particular attention to both the existence
and the substance of dissents from that decision.82 In O’Dell v.
Netherland, the Court relied on the existence of dissenters, noting
“[t]he array of views expressed in [the case] itself suggests that the
rule announced there was, in light of this Court’s precedent,
83
‘susceptible to debate among reasonable minds.’”
More recently, in 2004, the Court again emphasized the
84
significance of the dissenting opinion. Noting that the dissenters
argued that the Court’s precedents “did not control” that decision, the
Court concluded that “[i]t follows a fortiori that reasonable jurists
could have concluded that the [earlier cases] did not compel [the
85
latter].” Thus, the modern rule for determining whether a holding is
new is for the Court to “ask whether the decision in question was
dictated by precedent,” and, if “reasonable jurists” could disagree
about the correct application of the Court’s holding, a rule will be
considered new for Teague purposes.86
The “reasonableness” rule for determining whether a decision is
“new” accords with the language of the statute controlling availability
of the writ of habeas review. If there are multiple ways that
reasonable jurists can interpret a holding, none can be described as
“contrary to, or involv[ing] an unreasonable application of, clearly
established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the
87
United States,” the standard for habeas review. Furthermore,
correcting a state’s reasonable but mistaken interpretation of
Supreme Court precedent does nothing to advance the purpose of the
writ to encourage states to faithfully apply the law as it was then
understood.
Thus, the modern inquiry into if a rule is “new” hinges on whether
the Court believes that a decision is the only “reasonable application”

81. Id. at 538.
82. Beard v. Banks, 542 U.S. 406 (2004).
83. O’Dell v. Netherland, 521 U.S. 151, 159–60 (1997) (quoting Butler v. McKellar, 494
U.S. 407, 415 (1990)).
84. Beard, 542 U.S. at 415.
85. Id. at 416. The Court also disclaimed in a footnote that “we do not suggest that the
mere existence of a dissent suffices to show that the rule is new.” Id. at 416 n.5.
86. Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 308 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
87. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2006).
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of its precedent. The Court’s precedent indicates that it will variously
consider 1) whether the decision itself overrules an earlier holding or
purports to rely on precedent, 2) the extent of disagreement among
lower courts about whether Blakely is “new”, and 3) the existence and
substance of dissents to the opinion.
V. IS BLAKELY V. WASHINGTON A “NEW” RULE?
The challenge accepted by the Supreme Court in granting
certiorari in Burton v. Stewart was to apply the Teague v. Lane test to
its decision in Blakely v. Washington. After determining the
preliminary procedural issue of when Mr. Burton’s conviction became
final, the first substantive component of this application is
determining whether Blakely is a “new” rule or “dictated by
precedent.” Because I conclude that Blakely is likely not a “new” rule,
I need not explore whether Blakely might meet either of the two
exceptions that would grant the decision retroactive status even if it
were a “new” rule. To assess whether the Court is likely to conclude
that Blakely is a “new” rule in the future, I will look to each of the
factors the Court has previously relied on: (1) whether the decision
itself overrules an earlier holding or purports to rely on precedent, (2)
the extent of disagreement among lower courts about whether
Blakely is “new,” and (3) the existence and substance of dissents to
the opinion.
A. Does Blakely overrule an earlier holding or purport to rely on
precedent?
Clearly, the Court’s decision in Blakely v. Washington did not
overrule an earlier holding and thus is not easily categorized as a
“new” rule.88 In contrast, as Mr. Burton argued during oral argument,
the “jury verdict beyond a reasonable doubt” standard in Blakely was
expressed in Supreme Court precedent from as long ago as 1970 in In
89
re Winship. In that case, the Supreme Court stated that “[l]est there
remain any doubt about the constitutional stature of the reasonabledoubt standard, we explicitly hold that the Due Process Clause
protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a

88. See Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 415 (1990) (explaining when courts will consider
whether a rule is “new”).
89. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
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reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with
90
which he is charged.” In Apprendi v. New Jersey, the Court explained
that its decision relied on Winship and its progeny.91 During oral
argument, Burton’s counsel reminded the Court of “several passages
in Apprendi that said that the statutory maximum was the maximum
allowed based on the facts in the jury verdict,” and that these
statements were sufficient to dictate the aspect of Blakely’s holding
that would result in a favorable outcome for defendants like Mr.
Burton.92 Although Blakely also defined “statutory maximum” in a
manner later applied to the federal guidelines in United States v.
93
Booker, that application of Apprendi would not have been necessary
for Mr. Burton, and is not necessary for similarly situated defendants.
For Mr. Burton, all that would have been necessary is that the judge’s
discretion be “based on the facts in the jury verdict.”94
A point in favor of the position that Blakely is not a “new rule”
but rather is an application of established law is the fact that the
Blakely majority announced that its decision merely required
application of “the rule . . . expressed in Apprendi” and believed that
95
“precedents make clear” its ultimate holding. In Booker, the Court
continued to suggest that the Blakely decision was pre-ordained by
Apprendi, reiterating “[o]ur precedents, we explained, make clear that
the ‘statutory maximum’ for Apprendi purposes is the maximum
sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflects in
the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant.”96 Whereas these
statements are “not conclusive,”97 they demonstrate that, unlike
98
Lambrix v. Singletary, Blakely does purport to rely on precedent.
Therefore, this first factor suggests that Blakely is not a “new” rule
and should thus apply retroactively under the Teague test.

90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id. at 364.
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 484–92 (2000).
Transcript of Oral Argument at 21, Burton v. Stewart, 127 S. Ct. 793 (2007).
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
Transcript of Oral Argument at 21, Burton v. Stewart, 127 S. Ct. 793 (2007).
Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 301–03(2004).
Booker, 543 U.S. at 232.
Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 415 (1990).
Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 529 (1997).
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B. Do lower courts disagree about whether Blakely is “new”?
On the other hand, the opinions of various lower courts suggest
that Blakely might involve the creation of a “new” rule. A number of
federal circuit courts of appeal and state supreme courts had been
faced with Blakely-like situations after Apprendi v. New Jersey but
before Blakely v. Washington was decided, and concluded that
Apprendi did not extend to those situations.99 Similarly, after the
Blakely decision, a number of circuit courts of appeals considered
whether the decision was “new” under the Teague v. Lane test and
concluded that it was.100 Still, although the fact that lower courts did
not agree with the Court’s ultimate holding in Blakely is illustrative, it
is also “not dispositive.”101 Moreover, more interesting than the fact
that five courts of appeals decided that Blakely was a “new” rule for
Teague purposes is the reasoning behind these courts’ conclusions.
The first circuit court to consider Blakely’s retroactivity was the
102
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Price. The Price
court relied on the fact that Blakely defined “statutory maximum”
and thus crafted a new rule to conclude that Blakely, as a whole,
should not apply retroactively.103 However, as explained above, the
definition of “statutory maximum” is irrelevant to how Blakely
applies to Mr. Burton, or similarly situated defendants, who challenge
their confinement based upon the existence of judge-found facts.
Subsequently, the First, Eleventh, and Eighth Circuits each also
held that Blakely does not apply retroactively, but did so only after
concluding that the Supreme Court’s later decision in United States v.
104
Booker also does not apply on collateral review. As one of these
courts described, “Blakely claims are now viewed through the lens of
105
United States v. Booker . . . .” Unfortunately, this merging of the
Blakely and Booker decisions precludes any consideration of the

99. See Blakely, 542 U.S. at 320 n.1 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (contrasting one case which
extended Apprendi to a Blakely-like situation with sixteen cases which failed to do so).
100. United States v. Hernandez, 436 F.3d 851 (8th Cir. 2006); Cirilo-Munoz v. United
States, 404 F.3d 527 (1st Cir. 2005); Michael v. Crosby, 430 F.3d 1310 (11th Cir. 2005); Schardt v.
Payne, 414 F.3d 1025 (9th Cir. 2005); United States v. Price, 400 F.3d 844 (10th Cir. 2005).
101. Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S. 222, 237 (1992).
102. 400 F.3d 844 (10th Cir. 2005).
103. Id. at 847.
104. Crosby, 430 F.3d at 1312 n.2; Cirilo-Munoz, 404 F.3d at 532; Never Misses a Shot v.
United States, 413 F.3d 781, 783 (8th Cir. 2005).
105. Cirilo-Munoz, 404 F.3d at 532.
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application of Blakely to cases such as Mr. Burton’s, which do not
necessarily rely upon the Court’s application of Apprendi in Booker.
Whether the Court’s decision in Booker is “new” is a separate
question that must be addressed independently. As these circuit
courts did not address the issue of the retroactivity of Blakely directly,
their conclusions can have only limited force in the Court’s
determination of whether Blakely is “new.”
Finally, in Schardt v. Payne, the Ninth Circuit relied entirely on
those aforementioned cases in which lower courts had failed to
extend Apprendi to Blakely-like situations before the Supreme Court
decided Blakely itself.106 The Ninth Circuit reasoned that because the
lower courts had not reached the same conclusion regarding the
application of Apprendi that the Supreme Court eventually did, “the
rule announced in Blakely was clearly not apparent to all reasonable
jurists.”107 However, the logic of this position is weakened in particular
circumstances, such as those raised by Justice Souter during oral
108
argument in Burton. As he noted, the force of implication that can
be drawn from the existence of disagreements amongst the lower
courts is diminished when those courts are simply engaging in an
“exercise of hope” by “expressing the hope that the Court would
draw a distinction which it had not drawn,” rather than concluding
that “Apprendi requires a certain result.”109 After all, the purpose of
habeas is precisely to prevent this kind of independent wishful
thinking on the part of lower courts, and to “forc[e] trial and appellate
courts in both the federal and state system to toe the constitutional
110
mark.” To this end, allowing habeas review of lower courts’
decisions, which were decided between Apprendi and Blakely, serves
the very purpose Justice Harlan attributed to the Great Writ.
C. The existence and substance of dissents from the Blakely opinion
As noted above, the Court has recently focused on an opinion’s
dissenters when deciding whether a rule is “new” for Teague
purposes.111 In Blakely v. Washington, there were three separate
106. Schardt v. Payne, 414 F.3d 1025, 1035 (9th Cir. 2005).
107. Id.
108. Transcript of Oral Argument at 41, Burton v. Stewart, 127 S. Ct. 793 (2007).
109. Id.
110. Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 687 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
111. E.g., Beard v. Banks, 542 U.S. 406, 415 (2004).
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dissents from the Court’s decision, which were authored by Justice
112
O’Connor, Justice Kennedy, and Justice Breyer. As the Court made
clear in Beard v. Banks, the impact of these dissents on the Court’s
decision depends on the substance of their disagreement.113 In this
case, the impact of the dissents is potentially very limited by their lack
of disagreement with the majority regarding the substance of the
holding itself. In one remarkable moment during oral argument,
Justice Breyer, one of only two dissenters in Blakely who are still on
the Court (along with Justice Kennedy), acknowledged that when
writing his dissent he “couldn’t think of how they might have limited
Apprendi” so as to preclude Blakely’s outcome.114 This strongly
suggests that Blakely is not a “new rule.” Furthermore, during oral
argument in Burton v. Stewart, Justice Souter concluded his
questioning by asking the state whether reading Apprendi like Justice
O’Connor proposed in her Blakely dissent would have been a clear
application of Apprendi or something new. The state responded that it
“definitely would have been something new.”115 If the state is correct
that Justice O’Connor’s dissent was predicated on “a distinction which
simply was not addressed in Apprendi,”116 this suggests that, like
Justice Breyer’s dissent, her dissenting opinion also does not stand for
the proposition that Blakely is a “new” rule. Thus, the only one of the
three opinions that nudges in that direction is the dissenting opinion
of Justice Kennedy, which does not attack the Blakely decision on the
grounds that it does not obviously follow from Apprendi but rather
challenges Blakely based on a policy concern that the decision does
not comport with separation of powers ideals.
Taken together, the factors the Court looks to when deciding if
one of its decisions is “new” lean toward the conclusion that Blakely
does not establish a “new” rule but rather applies the Court’s
117
Apprendi decision, as the Court purports to do. However, this
conclusion is subject to disagreement on each of the factors
considered, and the Court’s recent proclivity for deeming their
decisions “new” might suggest the opposite outcome.

112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 314–47 (2004).
542 U.S. at 415.
Transcript of Oral Argument at 40, Burton v. Stewart, 127 S. Ct. 793 (2007).
Id. at 42.
Id.
Blakely, 542 U.S. at 301.
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V. CONCLUSION
It is important that the Supreme Court decide that Blakely v.
Washington is not a “new” decision when and if the Court grants
certiorari in a case similar to Burton. To fully understand the
118
application of Teague v. Lane, it is necessary to recall the context
within which this doctrine first arose. In developing his framework,
Justice Harlan explicitly noted that the move was necessary only
“given the current broad scope of constitutional issues cognizable on
habeas.”119 In the face of opposition like that of the dissenters to
Teague, who viewed the general rule against retroactivity as an
120
“unprecedented curtailment of the reach of the Great Writ,” Justice
Harlan specifically explained that the Court needed to limit the
availability of the writ in order to ensure the finality of state court
judgments.121 Perhaps most important is his explanation in Mackey v.
United States that “[a]s regards cases coming here on collateral review,
the problem of retroactivity is in truth none other than one of
resettling the limits of the reach of the Great Writ, which under the
recent doctrines of this Court has been given almost boundless
sweep.”122
In contrast to the expansive availability of habeas review to which
123
Justice Harlan and his contemporaries were responding, the Court
today decides questions of retroactivity against a backdrop of recent
legislative and judicially created restrictions on the availability of
habeas review. Among these changes are the provisions of the Anti124
Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”),
which involves a “new statute of limitations, increased deference to
state court findings, strict limitations on successive habeas petitions,
and special procedures for capital habeas petitioners.”125 Moreover,
these legislative changes reflect only part of the panoply of recent
changes to habeas’ availability. Describing the judicially created

118. 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
119. 401 U.S. 667, 688 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
120. 489 U.S. 288, 327 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
121. Mackey, 401 U.S. at 683.
122. Id. at 701–02.
123. Id.
124. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat.
1214 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 and 28 U.S.C.).
125. Aaron G. McCollough, For Whom the Court Tolls: Equitable Tolling of the AEDPA
Statute of Limitations in Capital Habeas Cases, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 365, 376 (2005).
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limitations which were created prior to AEDPA, one commentator
recognized,
The Court adopted and rigorously enforced strict rules of
procedural default, excluded Fourth Amendment claims from
habeas corpus review, made it more difficult for a habeas
petitioner to obtain an evidentiary hearing to prove a
constitutional violation, adopted an extremely restrictive doctrine
regarding the retroactivity of constitutional decisions, reduced the
burden on the states to establish harmless error once a
constitutional violation was found, and erected barriers to the
126
filing of a second habeas petition.

In light of these changes to the availability of habeas, especially
the statute of limitations, the Great Writ appears to be less of an
independent attack on confinement and more closely approximates
one particular method for reaching “final judgment.” With these
legislative changes to the scope of habeas corpus review, the practical
effect is that state decisions have greater finality sooner after they are
made, fewer prisoners are likely able to collaterally attack their
confinement, and fewer of the prisoners who do so will benefit from
Supreme Court decisions. In light of these effects and in the context
of the comparatively limited availability of the writ today, Justice
Harlan’s rationale for limiting the retroactivity of “new” decisions
may not be well founded.127
One important consideration in this regard is that AEDPA
128
adequately maintains a state’s “interest in finality” by including a
one-year statute of limitations within which prisoners may challenge
their confinement.129 The states’ interest in finality is thus already
preserved without the Teague rule. The additional limitations similarly
have the effect of reducing challenges to lower courts’ judgments. This
effect is demonstrated by Mr. Burton’s own case, as the Supreme
Court ultimately determined that he was not able to have his case

126. Stephen B. Bright, Is Fairness Irrelevant?: The Evisceration of Federal Habeas Corpus
Review and Limits on the Ability of State Courts to Protect Fundamental Rights, 54 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 1, 9 (1997) (internal citations omitted).
127. See generally Deborah L. Stahlkopf, A Dark Day for Habeas Corpus: Successive
Petitions Under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 40 ARIZ. L. REV.
1115 (1998).
128. Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 683 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
129. McCollough, supra note 125, at 376.
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decided because he failed to meet limitations on the availability of
130
habeas review. Furthermore, as state courts know that federal courts
have only a limited ability and time period within which to review
their judgments, it is likely that the purpose of habeas to ensure that
the states “toe the line” has already been severely hampered. Thus,
each of Justice Harlan’s rationales behind the creation of the Teague
framework is no longer controlling. Just as the Court has previously
limited Teague to the “circumstances which gave rise to it,”131 it may
make sense in today’s context to allow retroactivity even of “new”
rules, and to reconsider the Teague rule.
Still another perspective the Court may consider regarding Teague
is the effect that regularly deciding their decisions are “new” has on
general perspectives of the Court. When Justice Harlan originally
described his proposal for determining retroactivity, including the test
of when a decision should be described as “new,” he noted that “many,
though not all, of th[e] Court’s constitutional decisions are grounded
upon fundamental principles whose content does not change.”132
Although the Supreme Court may conclude, in some later case, that
Blakely is not “new” under Teague, application of the Teague test
above illustrates that this outcome is by no means certain. This
uncertainty reveals just how far the test for what constitutes a “new”
rule has drifted from Justice Harlan’s original proposal, and just how
difficult it has become for a court to conclude that a decision is not
“new.”
In a very real sense, Blakely is the prototypical non-”new” case,
which is “grounded upon fundamental principles whose content does
not change.” If this case, resting on “a fundamental reservation of
133
power in our constitutional structure” can be described as “new,”
the Court can surely describe any decision as “new.” This fact calls
into question the Court’s very method of decision-making. The
Court’s reluctance to hold that its decisions were “dictated by
precedent” is that the Court appears to be less bound by precedent
and “to depend on nothing more than the proclivities of the
individuals who now comprise a majority of th[e] Court.”134 In

130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

Burton v. Stewart, 127 S. Ct. 793 (2007).
Lockhart v Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 373 (1993).
Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 263 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 306 (2004).
Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 851 (1991).
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contrast, by deciding that Blakely and similar constitutionally-based
decisions are not “new,” the Court upholds the ideal of that body as
independent of its members. As Justice Scalia recently noted, “[w]hat
distinguishes the rule of law from the dictatorship of a shifting
Supreme Court majority is the absolutely indispensable requirement
135
that judicial opinions be grounded in consistently applied principle.”

135. McCreary County v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 545 U.S. 844, 890–91 (2005) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).

